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Abstract 
This paper incorporates endogenous money creation into the liquidity mismatch problem 
of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). We characterize a nominal economy where demandable 
deposits are created through lending. Depositors use sight deposits to buy consumption 
goods and the banks manage reserves to clear payments and to offset liquidity risk. We 
show that deposit contracts are suboptimal in terms of liquidity risk-sharing. We also 
observe that the self-fulfilling run depends on the refinancing rate of the central bank. Our 
analysis emphasizes the importance of effective lender of last resort policies to prevent 
expectational banking panics. 
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1 Introduction
The prevailing view in banking theory is, as Diamond and Dybvig [12] pointed
out, that “illiquidity of assets provides the rationale both for the existence of
banks and for their vulnerability to runs”.1 According to this theory, banks
channel pre-existing real assets from savers to finance illiquid entrepreneurial
projects. In this intermediation process, banks create liquidity, that is, they
oﬀer liabilities (deposits) that are immediately available while the assets they
hold (loans) are not. In other words, banks promise full recovery of deposits at
anytime although disposing of their assets before maturity may only come at a
cost. This liquidity mismatch between redeemable deposits and illiquid assets
explains the fragility of banks.
In a modern economy, depository institutions create the commitment to im-
plement a payment system by which transactions are cleared. These banks
endogenously extend credit whose liability counterpart is the production of gen-
erally acceptable means of payment in the shape of diﬀerent types of nominal
deposits. Within this process, payments and withdrawals usually take place as
electronic transfers and the settlement of these flows needs of outside money in
the form of cash or central bank reserves.2
In this paper we reformulate the model of Diamond and Dybvig [12] (DD for
short) to incorporate a set of elements aimed at reproducing these basic features
of a modern monetary system. First, instead of sticking to the traditional
description of banks as financial vehicles that take real assets from savers to lend
them to ultimate borrowers, eﬀectively intermediating pre-existing deposits, we
consider that when banks originate a new loan they are creating nominal inside
money and purchasing power. Thus, the intermediation process performed by
banks starts on the asset side of their balance sheets. Second, the maturity and
liquidity mismatch between bank assets and liabilities arises automatically when
a loan is originated. This is because the counterpart to the provision of a long
term loan is the creation of an overnight liability in the form of a disposable
deposit. In this sense, the liquidity risk faced by the banking institution is due
to the transfer of funds between banks, which is solved by managing a demand
for outside money produced by the central bank. Finally, the vast majority of
bank loans cannot be recalled nor banks have any say about the liquidation
decision of the investment projects pursued by borrowers.
We show how including these elements have important implications on the
equilibrium of the model and its predictions on financial fragility as compared
with traditional banking theories based on the seminal work of DD. On this
respect, DD showed that, with no aggregate uncertainty, (i) banks can reproduce
the optimal allocation among depositors with random liquidity needs, and (ii)
1See also Bryant [6], Holmstrom and Tirole [23], and Diamond and Rajan [13],[14].
2 In practice, central banks support a payment system through which transactions can be
easily settled. According to the BIS [5], the pivotal role of central bank money in payment
systems “reflects the layered architecture of financial systems, whereby private individuals
and non-financial businesses hold (part of ) their liquidity in banks, and banks in turn hold
(part of) their liquidity in the central bank”.
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there also exists a self-fulfilling equilibrium wherein uninsured depositors rush to
withdraw their savings from the banking system. When this happens, banks are
unable to honor their repayment obligations and become insolvent. In contrast,
we show that the uniqueness of equilibrium depends on the refinancing policy of
the central bank. In particular, the possibility of a run only appears at relatively
high refinancing rates. Furthermore, we also show that equilibrium is always
ineﬃcient from a social point of view.
A few papers have explored the implications of introducing inside money
over the withdrawal incentives of depositors and the optimality of deposit con-
tracts in terms of liquidity risk-sharing.3 As we stated above, financial contracts
are usually denominated in nominal terms, and withdrawals do not imply that
money is per se converted into cash and drained out of the banking system.
Skeie [32] considers these characteristics and shows the existence of a unique
and eﬃcient equilibrium when nominal deposits are repayable in inside money.
The non-bank run equilibrium is explained by price adjustments in the goods’
market only when banks choose the optimal amount of liquidity that is stored
in the economy. In the same line, Allen et al. [3] incorporate fiat money issued
by the central bank into Allen et al. [4] and find that the eﬃciency and unique-
ness of the equilibrium also holds with aggregate return uncertainty, aggregate
liquidity shocks, and bank specific liquidity shocks. Unlike these important
contributions on this subject, we find that the uniqueness of equilibrium does
not necessarily depend on nominal prices adjusting in response to a run. We
connect the self-fulfilling run with the central bank response to the panic. In-
deed, we state that expectational runs of the Diamond and Dybvig type can be
prevented by eﬀective lender of last resort policies that oﬀset the incentives of
depositors to coordinate in a run. In addition, we cast doubt about the capacity
of nominal deposit contracts to implement the optimal amount of real liquidity.
A key feature of the present work is the lack of commitment of depository insti-
tutions to ensure future consumption needs of depositors. With nominal deposit
contracts repayable in cash, banks cannot set in the present credible promises
about the real value of future payoﬀs because of their inability to set prices.
Furthermore, the implementation of monetary policy by the central bank in our
model reproduces actual institutions we find in our economies.
These nominal banking models, including ours, do not support the idea
that coordination failures leading to a bank run can be explained exclusively
by illiquidity itself. The view of purely self-fulfilling runs was endorsed by
Friedman and Schwartz [17]’s explanation of the bank panics that occurred in
the United States up to the 1930s but was disputed by Gorton [21] and Calomiris
and Mason [8], [9]. More recently, the collapses of Bearn Stearns and Lehman
Brothers (Lucas and Stokey [24]), and the run of the UK bank Northern Rock on
3Other papers have developed nominal frameworks to explore other issues for financial
stability. Allen and Gale [1] introduce fiat money in a model of banking and show that
variations in the price level allow nominal debt to become eﬀectively state contingent so that
risk-sharing is improved. Diamond and Rajan [15] find that nominal contracts cannot prevent
bank runs when there is idiosyncratic risk on the bank’s asset side caused by delays in asset
returns.
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2007 (Shin [31]) do not seem to be related to a coordination failure, so additional
elements on the bank’s fundamentals are required to explain bank instability.4
In our case, this element is the refinancing policy of the central bank.
An interesting feature of the model described here is that it provides an ex-
plicit bridge between banking and monetary theories. Typically, banking models
are set in real terms and abstract from the ability of depository institutions to
endogenously expand or contract the size of their balance sheet.5 Arguably, one
of the drives of these expansions and contractions, and of their potential eﬀects
on economic activity and price determination, is the monetary policy stance of
the central bank. Because these banking models are built in real terms and do
not include a monetary authority, they are not designed to analyze these inter-
actions. On the other hand, monetary models typically abstract from an active
banking sector.6 These models therefore are not able to incorporate the endoge-
nous management of the liabilities of depository institutions into the analysis of
the money creation process.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the real economy
and connects with the DD model. Section 3 reviews the main ingredients of a
modern monetary system which will be included in the nominal model below.
Section 4 introduces money in the model and shows the main results. Finally,
section 5 concludes.
2 The real setup
The real model reproduces the maturity transformation problem described in
DD but introducing labor in the production technology. As it will be clear in
Section 4, this modification does not alter the production possibility frontier in
any respect but allows for the existence of inside money.
2.1 The environment
Consider an economy characterized by a circle with measure 1 and three dates,
indexed by  = 0 1 2. Locations are continuously distributed over the circle.
On each location there is a continuum of identical risk averse households with
measure 1. Households are composed of a worker and an entrepreneur. Each
worker is endowed in period 0 with a unit of time, whereas entrepreneurs have
access to a risk-free productive technology.
Households face uncertainty about future liquidity needs in period 0. With
probability  ∈ (0 1) the household becomes impatient ( = 1) and prefers
to consume in period 1, while with probability (1− ) the household is patient
( = 2) and consumes at  = 2. Once households observe types at the beginning
4Goldstein and Pauzner [19], and Rochet and Vives [29] provide the theoretical foundations
to fill the gap between both literatures.
5 See, for example, the models described in Allen and Gale [2] or Freixas and Rochet [16].
6 In fact, the workhorse model for monetary analysis, the neokeynesian model, dispose not
only of banks but also of money all together. See, for example, the models discussed in Gali
[18] or Woodford [34].
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of period 1 they make choices and obtain a utility (), where  denotes the
consumption of a household of type  ∈ {1 2} at period  = .7 The function
() has the following properties
0()  0 00()  0 lim→0
0() =∞ and lim→∞
0() = 0
We assume further that the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion satisfies
−
00()
0()  1 (1)
everywhere.
The productive technology transforms each unit of labor employed at  = 0
into   1 units of the good at  = 2. If a fraction  ∈ [0 1] of the production
is interrupted at  = 1 it will produce a scrap value equal to . The remaining
fraction left until maturity of the production process will yield (1−) in period
2. In addition to the productive technology, households have also access to
storage,  ∈ [0 1], without any cost. Obviously, nobody will store anything
from  = 0 to  = 1 since storing is dominated by the production technology
in period 0. It may be the case, however, that storage could be used between
periods 1 and 2.
A household of type  ∈ {1 2} faces the problem of choosing in period 1 (i)
the fraction  of the productive technology to be liquidated, (ii) the amount
 to store between  = 1 and  = 2, and (iii) consumption, . Clearly, if
households lived in autarky, they would choose to liquidate the whole project
in the event of becoming impatient, 1 = 1, and consume 1 = 1 of the good
at  = 1, storing nothing, 1 = 0. On the other hand, patient households will
liquidate none of the project, 2 = 0, and store nothing, 2 = 0, at  = 1,
consuming 2 =   1 in period 2.
2.2 Risk sharing
If types were publicly observable at  = 0, it is easy to see that a planner who
verifies types would choose not to store, while determining 1 and 2, together
with the aggregate fraction of the productive technology to be liquidated pre-
maturely, , to maximize
(1) + (1− )(2) (2)
subject to the feasibility constraints
1 ≤  (3)
and
(1− )2 = (1− ) (4)
7Throughout the paper, subscripts will refer to periods ( = 1 2) and superscripts to types
( = 1 2).
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The first order conditions of this problem to determine the optimal choice
{1∗ 2∗ } are
0(1∗) = 0 ¡2∗¢  (5)
together with the two resource constraints (3) and (4). These expressions char-
acterize the eﬃcient risk-sharing for this economy and are equivalent to the ones
in DD. Since   1 and because of the degree of risk aversion considered in (1),
it turns out that 1  1∗  2∗  , which means households would prefer to
share ex ante the risk associated with the timing of consumption.
2.3 A time bank
Insurance against consumption uncertainty could be provided by introducing
a contingent time bank. Workers can deposit their time at  = 0 in a time
depository institution. The time bank then designs a contingent deposit contract
at  = 0 providing 1 units of consumption at  = 1 to those withdrawing their
deposits in that period, or 2 units at  = 2 for those who wait to withdraw
at that period. The time bank then puts to work all the depositors in the
productive technology in period 0 and chooses the aggregate liquidation of the
productive investment, , to maximize the expected utility of depositors
(1) + (1− )(2) (6)
subject to the feasibility constraint
1 ≤ 
and
(1− )2 ≤ (1− )
Obviously, this problem yields the optimal allocation found in the planner’s
problem above.
This time deposit contract {1 2} provides eﬃcient risk-sharing because it
determines implicit contingent wages to be paid to households at  = 1 depend-
ing on their realized types. The  = 1 equivalent contingent wages depositors
are receiving for providing time at  = 0 are
11 = 

 = 
1 and 21 = 1− 

1−  =
2
 
for workers belonging to impatient and patient households, respectively. Be-
cause of the assumed degree of risk aversion (1), it must be the case that
11 = 

  1 
1− 
1−  = 
2
1
which allows to obtain the first-best allocation.
The contingent time deposit contract supports, however, a suboptimal equi-
libria. The bank designs such contract inferring that there will be  withdrawals
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in period 1. As in the seminal work of DD, patient households have incentives to
withdraw before time if they anticipate that the bank will be forced to liquidate
a significant amount of its long term investment to service the increasing de-
mand of early withdrawals. Let ¯ be the minimum amount of early withdrawals
in period 1 to have a self-fulfilling run. This threshold satisfies
¯ = 

(1− ) +  
If late consumers expect the fraction of early withdrawals to be larger than ¯,
it will be optimal for them to withdraw at date 1 and store the proceeds until
 = 2. In this second equilibrium the bank suﬀers a run since anyone who waits
until the last period will get nothing.
3 Main features of a modern monetary system
This section reviews some of the features of modern depository institutions
not included in traditional models of banking that we believe are crucial to
understand banks’ contribution in our economies.
3.1 The production of loans and deposits
The first challenge of traditional banking models rests on the way the production
of loans and deposits is described. In those models, this process starts on the
liability side of banks’ balance sheets when a saver deposits some pre-existing
real assets. The bank then transfers those resources to a borrower who puts
them into some productive use.
This description is at odds with current procedures in depository institu-
tions. As a matter of practice, commercial banks create money, in the form
of bank deposits, when making new loans. This is how the bulk of deposits
we use to make payments is originated.8 If you could trace back the life of a
deposit someone has recently transferred to you, invariably it was born with a
loan to someone somewhere in the past. This view in which money is created
through credit is shared both by academicians (see Goodhart [20]), as well as
central bankers (see, among others McLeay et al. [25], from the Bank of Eng-
land, Holmes [22], from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, or Constancio
[11] from the ECB), regulators (see Turner [33]), and market practitioners (see
Sheard [30]).
This deposit creation power is the distinguishing characteristic of depository
institutions.9 Of course, this ability to create its own liabilities on the spot
does not provide banks with an unlimited capacity to expand their balance
sheets. This is because, among other constraints, the process of loan and money
creation exposes banks to a number of risks. Among the exposures faced by
8See McLeay et al. [25].
9The accounting conventions that allow banks to create money out of nothing are described
in Werner [35] and [36].
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banks we consider liquidity risk. This risk is associated with having enough
generally acceptable assets to cover the net flow of payments ordered by the
bank’s clients. Notice that the process of endogenous money creation through
loan provision endorsed in this paper automatically exposes banks to both a
maturity as well as a liquidity mismatch between assets and liabilities. This
is because the counterpart of a long term loan is the creation of demandable
short term deposits. In this sense, agents do not ask for a loan to sit on the
funds created but to make a payment they lacked the funds for. Thus, deposits
will, and are designed to, exchange hands at the very moment they are created.
Loans, on the contrary, are not an asset banks can dispose of that easily. Banks
thus need an asset with the same degree of immediacy as the (net flow of)
deposits they hold in the liability side of their balance sheets. Reserves, in
the form of current accounts at the central bank, are these assets. Because
reserves need to be borrowed, they are onerous to obtain. As producing loans
necessarily means obtaining reserves to service the deposit these loans create,
the borrowing cost of those reserves also constrain how much banks want to
expand their balance sheets.10
3.2 The endogenous nature of financial intermediation
The second challenge of traditional models of banking has to do with the prede-
termined nature of the volume of intermediation. In traditional models, savers
hold a pre-existing volume of savings, in the form of a stock of real assets, that
needs to be transferred to borrowers. This means that the amount of interme-
diation that takes place in these models, that is, the size of the balance sheets
of commercial banks, is bounded by the amount of already existing savings to
be transferred.
Unlike this description of traditional models of banking, our endogenous view
of the intermediation process performed by banks is not constrained by existing
savings or deposits. Apart from the constraints mentioned in the previous sec-
tion, banks could produce more financial assets, to be held by the nonfinancial
sector, as long as they expect the corresponding credit that originated those
assets to be paid in the future. The purchasing power created with these new
loans could be used to pay for existing real assets as well as for new consumption
or investment goods or even for the purchase of other financial assets.
This endogenous view of bank intermediation has important implications for
the way we should analyze bank’s balance sheet dynamics and its connections to
money creation. If we look at depository institutions as a whole, when a bank
decides to expand its balance sheet by granting a loan, eﬀectively it is increasing
the asset side of depository institutions until the time the loan matures, provided
the bank keeps the loan in its books for the whole time. This means the banking
sector needs to maintain a matching liability also throughout that period. As
mentioned before, at the very moment the loan is granted, the matching liability
10A second exposure for banks is solvency risk given that there is the possibility that the
loans banks provide are not repaid and the value of assets could drop below the value of their
liabilities. To stay as close as possible to DD we do not consider this risk here.
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is a sight deposit which quickly is transferred to another party as a payment for
an exchange. The party receiving these funds now has to decide what to do with
them. This portfolio choice will split the funds that originally started as sight
deposits between liquid or illiquid bank liabilities. The former are accepted
as a general means of payment and included in a broad monetary aggregate
while the latter are not. Throughout the life of the loan that originated these
bank liabilities, the diﬀerent owners of those funds will be transferring them
and splitting them in diﬀerent ways, changing the amount and composition of
broad monetary aggregates.
Notice this split of the particular liabilities of the bank associated with a
particular loan will depend both on the demand for those assets by customers
as well as on the supply of those liabilities by the bank themselves. This way,
the funding problem of expanding the balance sheet of a bank is summarized
by the ability of the bank to convince someone to hold a matching liability
until the initial loan matures and to manage the liquidity risks associated with
each type of liability. The only way out of this service obligation is to take the
original loan out of the balance sheet either by selling it out directly or through
securitization.
3.3 The role of reserves and the implications of bank runs
The third challenge of the traditional view of banking is the role reserves play
in the process of money creation. In the traditional view, reserves are just
deposited assets that are left idle or invested in an inferior technology that allows
full recovery at anytime. In reality, reserves, in the form of current accounts at
the central bank, are a completely diﬀerent object than customer’s deposits at
commercial banks or the loans these banks provide to their borrowers. Reserves
are produced by the central bank, while loans and deposits are produced by
commercial banks. Banks maintain reserves for two reasons. The first reason
is to satisfy depositor’s payments demand. Whenever a client wishes to make a
payment to be transferred to another bank, this payment is usually done with
reserves. The second reason is to satisfy reserve requirements wherever these
requirements are in place. Thus, reserve demand is driven both by regulation as
well as by the netting of payments derived from the loan and deposit creation to
finance economic activity. Reserve supply, on the other hand, is characterized
by the monetary policy stance of the central bank. This monetary policy stance
is typically defined as a target on very short rates (i.e. overnight) in money
markets. In implementing its monetary policy, monetary authorities are usually
ready to supply, at the target rate, as much reserves as depository institutions
demand. When the monetary policy stance changes, the central bank modifies
its interest rate target but still “reads" the amount of reserves needed to support
that new target from demand by commercial banks.
An important conclusion can be drawn from the description in the previ-
ous paragraph. In modern monetary systems the amount of reserve holdings
should not constrain loan and deposit production by commercial banks. As
long as central banks are willing to supply reserves at the specified refinancing
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rate, reserve demand is determined by reserve requirements and the netting of
payments both of which depend on loan and deposit creation.11
At this point it is important to connect the notion of reserves with the in-
termediation performed by commercial banks and the risk of facing a run. As
mentioned above, because in traditional models banks intermediate real assets
that are put directly into an illiquid production process, reserves are just de-
posited assets that are left idle or invested in an inferior technology that allows
full recovery at anytime. In the event that depositors demand funds above the
reserves previously accumulated by the bank, this financial institution will be
required to force borrowers to repay back the loan prematurely by liquidating
their production projects with the corresponding eﬃciency costs.
In our view of the intermediation process, when depositors do not trust a
bank they will demand their liquid deposits to be converted to a financial asset
produced by a diﬀerent financial institution. This could be cash or a deposit
in a diﬀerent bank. To honor this convertibility promise, banks need to borrow
reserves either from the central bank or from other depository institutions or
else, sell existing assets in exchange for these reserves. However, liquidating
an asset, a loan for example, is not the same as liquidating the productive
investment this loan has financed, nor it means recalling the loan. This is for
several reasons. First, the vast majority of loans are noncallable. This is the
case of basically all mortgages and, according to the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, of 87.5 percent of all C&I loans.12 Second, liquidating
a loan means selling in the market the right to the future cash flows the loan
generates. The borrower will continue with his/her investment with the loan
payments now accruing to a diﬀerent creditor. The anticipation that banks will
not be able to honor these promises, either because they will not raise enough
liquid funds in the market or from the central bank or because they will sell
assets at a significant discount, is the reason why holders of its short term debt
run the bank. But this fact, by itself, does not mean that real investments
are aﬀected by the run as the traditional view contends. Any eﬀect on real
investment decisions should indirectly come from general equilibrium eﬀects
through prices.
11An important element to the description in the main text is the possible connections
between the amount of reserves and the amount of deposits. These connections are exemplified
by the Treasury accounts at the central bank and cash holdings by the nonfinancial sector.
For example, as we withdraw cash from ATMs, banks use their reserves to get the banknotes
needed to replenish their cash machines. In normal times, however, these movements are not
significant and the central bank usually accommodates them to restore the levels of reserves
held previously by banks.
12 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statistical Release E2. This figure
is the average fraction of noncallable loans, weighted by volume, between the second quarter
of 1997 and the first quarter of 2003. In 2003 the Board stopped including the amount of C&I
loans that are callable because, representing a small fraction of total loans, their behavior did
not significantly diﬀered from loans which are not callable. See Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System [7].
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4 The nominal economy
4.1 The setup
In this section we add nominal deposit contracts and a flow of nominal funds into
the real economy of Section 2. To do so, we incorporate the ideas described in
Section 3. In particular, we include banks that (i) create endogenous money in
the form of deposits when providing loans, and (ii) manage central bank reserves
to honor the convertibility promise associated with deposits. We also separate
the liquidation decision of financial positions from that of real investments. We
then explore the extent to which these nominal contracts achieve optimal risk-
sharing and study whether self-fulfilling panics do occur.
Production technologies and preferences remain equal as described in Section
2. That is, entrepreneurs use labor hired at  = 0 in the productive technologies
whose proceeds will be collected at either  = 1 or  = 2. To introduce a role
for banks, assume entrepreneurs hire workers in a competitive labor market.
Furthermore, when workers are hired, at  = 0, these entrepreneurs lack the
credibility to convince those workers they will get paid in the future, when
production takes place either at  = 1 or  = 2.
The function of banks under this setting is to intermediate between house-
holds in this payment process. Assume each location is served by a continuum
of banks with measure 1. The timing of events is as follows. At  = 0, entre-
preneurs borrow inside money,  , from one of the banks located in the same
location they live in. This loan produces a double entry in the bank’s balance
sheet. On the asset side, the bank annotates the right associated with the loan
taken by the entrepreneur. On the other hand, means of payments are created,
and the liability side reflects the right of the entrepreneur to dispose of those
funds to make payments. The interest rate of these loans is  to be paid at the
end of period  = 2
Still at time  = 0, the loan is used by entrepreneurs to pay workers in
advance for their labor services. Notice the introduction of banks solves the
commitment problem of the entrepreneurs as wages are paid in advance. Fur-
thermore, it also solves any commitment problem on the part of workers as the
receipt from these transfers is proof of the wage payments and, therefore, can
be used by entrepreneurs to claim the workers’ labor services. Additionally,
deposits are homogeneous units of account that can be used by households to
buy goods from entrepreneurs at either  = 1 or  = 2. When households pay for
consumption goods, they transfer these deposits to an entrepreneur. A nominal
price for consumption goods will be formed as deposits are exchanged for goods.
Entrepreneurs then use these revenues from selling the goods they produce to
pay back the loan they asked for at period 0. That is the reason these deposits
are accepted back by entrepreneurs in exchange for consumption goods. Thus,
with the introduction of depository institutions, loan and deposit creation by
banks are used to bridge the intertemporal gap between the wage and goods
payments in this economy.
Once households receive income  from the payment of wages, they make
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a portfolio choice by which they split those funds between liquid and illiquid
assets. Liquid assets, 1, have the form of a sight deposits disposable at any
time. Illiquid assets, , have the form of a time deposits that pays oﬀ at  = 2.
At  = 0 households face the constraint
1 + ≤ (7)
At the beginning of the interim period,  = 1, households receive the remu-
neration from their sight deposits at the interest rate 1. Then, the liquidity
shock realizes and households learn whether they are of the patient or impa-
tient type. At this point, households have the opportunity to buy goods. This
means these households will transfer part of their liquid funds to entrepreneurs
in exchange for goods produced at  = 1. These liquid funds consists of the
gross sight deposits, (1 + 1)1. Banks also allow households to liquidate part
of their time deposits, ∆, at a cost. The bank will charge an early liquida-
tion fee 0 ≤  ≤ 1 per unit of liquidated time deposit. The parameter  is a
measure of how illiquid these other bank liabilities are as compared with sight
deposits. Thus, the total amount of liquid funds to be used for goods purchases
is (1+1)1+(1−)∆. Let  be the nominal price of goods in period . House-
holds then could buy, at this price, goods for consumption, , or for storage,
.
Because at the time households make decisions on period  = 1 they already
know their type, their choices will depend on of whether the household is im-
patient,  = 1, or patient,  = 2. Goods purchases at  = 1 are then subject to
the following cash in advance constraints
11 + 11 ≤ (1 + 1)1 + (1− )∆1 (8)
and
12 ≤ (1 + 1)1 + (1− )∆2 (9)
for impatient and patient households, respectively. Notice patient households
do not buy goods for consumption but could decide to buy them for storage.
Once goods purchases take place, the household makes another portfolio
choice allocating  = 1 resources into either cash, , or sight deposits, 2 .13
The available resources are whatever funds are left from the purchases of goods
plus the revenues from selling goods obtained from liquidating part of the pro-
ductive technology, . Thus, in making these choices, households face the
portfolio constraint
1 + 12 ≤ (1 + 1)1 + (1− )∆1 − 1
¡1 + 1¢+ 11 (10)
and
2 + 22 ≤ (1 + 1)1 + (1− )∆2 − 12 + 12 (11)
At the beginning of period  = 2, only patient households are buying goods.
Therefore, they face the cash-in-advance constraint
22 ≤2 + (1 + 2)22 + (1 + )
¡ −∆2¢  (12)
13Because the economy stops at  = 2, banks only supply sight deposits at  = 1.
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In this case, liquid funds are the cash hoarded from period  = 1, 2, plus
the return on sight deposits, (1 + 2)22 , and on the remaining time deposits
which are due precisely at period  = 2, (1 + ) ¡ −∆2¢. Then, after these
goods are bought, the household has to pay back the original loan taken by the
entrepreneur, so, it must be the case that
(1+) ≤2+(1+2)22+(1+)
¡ −∆2¢−22+22+2(1−2) (13)
That is, the loan needs to be repaid with whatever resources are left from
buying goods, plus revenues from selling goods obtained either from the storage
performed at  = 1 or from the productive technology not liquidated at  = 1.
On the other hand, impatient agents do not buy goods at  = 2 and they only
care about repaying back the loan, that is,
(1+) ≤1+(1+2)12+(1+)
¡ −∆1¢−21+21+2(1−1) (14)
This setup includes several features worth mentioning. First, the intermedi-
ation role played by banks starts when a borrower asks for a loan at time  = 0.
The loan is produced because the borrower (entrepreneur) lacks the means of
payment to make a purchase (wage payment). Then, once these means of pay-
ment, in the form of deposits, are created, households split those assets into
liquid (sight deposits) and illiquid (time deposit) funds. In this sense, the liq-
uidity problem of the household is financial rather than technological. That
is, to make a purchase, households need financial claims which are generally
acceptable. Because at time  = 0 they face the risk of needing to buy goods
at  = 1, they have to maintain liquid financial funds for precautionary reasons
at the corresponding opportunity cost. These liquid funds then circulate in
the economy as broad money as long as the loan does not mature. Notice this
sequence of events is opposite to the one in DD and the subsequent literature
where the intermediation process starts when a saver deposit assets in the bank
to be loaned out to a borrower.
Second, this intermediation service implies two obligations to depository
institutions. From a liability side perspective, the production of deposits means
the bank has to service the payment orders of depositors. Obviously, if the
owner of the deposits make payments to other clients of the same bank, this
service obligation is very easy to fulfill. The bank just renames the owner of
the deposits. However, if the destination of the payment is a client of another
bank, then the transfer of deposits must be met by a transfer of liquid assets.
This will also happen if a household wants to convert the deposit into outside
money (cash). Unlike DD, these liquid assets are not deposits that are left idle
or invested in an inferior short term technology (remember the intermediation
process starts on the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet). These liquid assets
are borrowed from the central bank either in the form of cash in banks’ vaults or
in the form of reserves (current accounts in the central bank). The refinancing
rate of the central bank will be denoted .
Thus, the role outside money plays in this model diﬀers from that on the
existing literature at least on two instances. Ex ante, central bank liquidity is
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not needed for the creation of loans and deposits by banks. These financial
institutions are autonomous in that respect. On the other hand, ex post, once
payments are made, the liquidity risk banks face, and therefore, the need to
borrow outside money from the central bank, is not so much related to depositors
disposing of their deposits as to the net transfer of funds between banks and
into outside money the use of these deposits imply. For example, in the model
here, under the assumption that all payments are distributed evenly across all
banks, depositors will be disposing of their deposits but there would not be any
need for banks to hold liquid assets as all net flows between them will be zero.
It is precisely the fact that payments are unevenly distributed across banks the
reason why outside money is needed to settle accounts among them.
From an asset side perspective, the other obligation banks face has to do with
the possibility that the value of their assets falls below that of their liabilities.
This may well happen if a fraction of loans are not repaid in full. Notice the
value of deposits, and the corresponding value of the obligations they generate,
should not be aﬀected by that event. This obligation is met by a new category
of liabilities, capital, which should absorb fluctuations in the value of assets.
In the model here, because loans are to be repaid, there are no solvency issues
associated with the riskiness of assets and capital is not needed.
The third point to stress is the maturity mismatch between bank assets and
liabilities. In the model, loans take two periods to mature while deposits are
available to depositors anytime. Notice this maturity mismatch is an inevitable
consequence of loan provision. Of course, the bank can manage its balance sheet
to reduce or eliminate that maturity mismatch. In particular, the bank will
manage the supply of liquid (sight deposits) and illiquid (time deposits) to take
this mismatch into account. However, because loans are provided essentially to
produce the means of payments a borrower lacks and, therefore, to be disposable
immediately, automatically the asset the loan creates will have a longer maturity
than the liability associated with it.
To understand the problems associated with the maturity mismatch of assets
and liabilities of the bank and the solvency problems this could cause, we can
look at the net worth of the bank at  = 2. This net worth is equal to
2 = (1 + ) −
− £(1 + )1 + (1 + 2)12 + (1 + ) ¡ −∆1¢¤
−(1− ) £(1 + )2 + (1 + 2)22 + (1 + ) ¡ −∆2¢¤  (15)
That is, the net worth will be equal to the repayment of the loan, (1 + ) ,
which is assumed to be paid in full, minus the obligations to depositors, both
from patient and impatient households. These obligations are the gross payment
of sight, (1 + 2)12 , and time, (1 + )
¡ −∆¢, deposits plus the cost of
providing cash, (1+ ). This cash has to be borrowed from the central bank
at the rate . Having 2 positive is the condition households evaluate at
 = 1 to predict whether the bank will be solvent at  = 2. Anticipation that
the net worth of the bank could be negative at  = 2 could trigger a run at
 = 1. Clearly, given that rates  and  are set on period  = 0, high policy
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rates  together with a strong enough desire to convert sight deposits into cash,
could render the bank insolvent.
Importantly, contrary to the literature based on DD and the intermediation
of real assets, this model separates the liquidation of financial positions from
the liquidation of investment projects. The loan the bank holds provides a
right to a future flow of funds for the bank. This flow of funds originates from
the production and selling activities of the borrowers (the entrepreneurs in the
model). In the event of insolvency, forcing the bank to liquidate that asset to
respond to a deposit outflow, does not necessarily imply the production activity
financed with that loan has to be liquidated too. As mentioned on Section 3,
loans are usually noncallable so, in general, banks cannot force borrowers to pay
earlier than what is established in the loan contract. What the bank can do is
to try to sell the asset in the market, possibly at a discount. This means the
bank is only obtaining a fraction of the present discounted value of cash flows
produced by the loan. But selling the loan this way, per se, has nothing to do
with the ability of the borrower to pay back the loan. Thus, the liquidation of
bank assets is just a redistribution of future flows between market participants
and does not need to imply a real cost for society as a whole.
Of course, the fact that financial liquidation is separated from real investment
liquidation does not mean these two decisions are not linked. But any connection
between them must go through general equilibrium eﬀects as changes in prices
and interest rates in response to a generalized failure of the banking system may
induce households to take them simultaneously. We look at this possibility in
the solution of the model below.
4.2 Solution
4.2.1 Individual problems
Each household  ∈ {1 2} faces the problem of choosing consumption, , stor-
age, , liquidation of the productive technology, , the portfolio allocation at
 = 0 between sight deposits, 1 and time deposits, , the liquidation of time
deposits, ∆, as well as the portfolio allocation at  = 1, between cash,, and
sight deposits, 2 , to maximize utility () subject to constraints (8) through
(14) depending on whether the household is impatient,  = 1, or patient,  = 2.
In making these choices, households take as given prices, namely, nominal good
prices in each period, 1 and 2, and interest rates on loans, , time deposits,
, and sight deposits, 1 and 2.
To describe the problem of households, notice that all nominal variables can
be normalized by the initial level of the loan,  . Denote normalized nominal
variables by the corresponding lower case letter. Take now a household of type
, entering period  = 1 with (normalized) sight, 1, and time, , deposits. Let
(1 ) be the maximum level of utility this household is going to obtain as a
function of its type and its portfolio choice. The problem the household solves
is then
1(1 ) = max(1) (16)
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subject to
11 + 11 ≤ (1 + 1)1 + 1(1− ) (17)
12 + 12 ≤ (1 + 1)1 + 1(1− )− 1(1 + 1) + 11 (18)
and
1 +  ≤ 21 + 2(1− 1)+12 + (1 + 2)12 + (1 + )(− 1) (19)
if the household is impatient ( = 1), or
2(1 ) = max(2) (20)
subject to
12 ≤ (1 + 1)1 + 2(1− ) (21)
22 + 22 ≤ (1 + 1)1 + 2(1− )− 12 + 12 (22)
222 ≤ 22 + (1 + 2)12 + (1 + )(− 2) (23)
and
1 +  ≤ 22 + 2(1− 2)+22 + (1 + 2)22 + (1 + )(− 2)− 222 (24)
if the household is patient ( = 2).
On period  = 0 the household chooses its portfolio to maximize expected
utility
 = max1(1 ) + (1− )2(1 ) (25)
subject to the budget constraint
1 +  = 1. (26)
On the other hand, banks make choices to maximize their net worth at  = 2,
2, specified in (15). This expression can also be normalized by  , so banks
decide on their supply of (normalized) sight and time deposits to maximize
2 = 1 +  −  £(1 + )1 + (1 + 2)12 + (1 + ) ¡− 1¢¤
−(1− ) £(1 + )2 + (1 + 2)22 + (1 + ) ¡− 2¢¤  (27)
4.2.2 Equilibrium with valued deposits
In this economy, an equilibrium is defined as usual.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a collection of allocations {, , , 1, ,
, , and 2} for  ∈ {1 2} and prices {1, 2, , , 1, and 2} such that:
1. given prices, allocations solve individual problems both of households and
banks, and
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2. prices are such that goods markets clear, for  = 1
(1 + 1) + (1− )2 = 1 + (1− )2
and  = 2
(1− )2 =  £(1− 1)+ 1¤+ (1− ) £(1− 2)+ 2¤ 
At  = 1, impatient households, representing a fraction  of the population,
demand goods to cover for consumption, 1, and storage, 1, while supplying the
part of the productive technology they have liquidated, 1. On the other hand,
patient households, representing a fraction 1 −  of the population, demand
goods only storage, 2, and supply the part of the productive technology they
have liquidated, 2. At  = 2, only impatient agents demand goods, this time
for consumption, 2, while both impatient and patient households supply goods
from the return of the productive investment not liquidated at  = 1 together
with the storing carried over from the previous period. Notice the definition
imposes that labor markets clear as workers supply labor inelastically. Also,
financial markets clear because the objective function of banks is linear in choice
variables, so that the supply of financial services is perfectly elastic at market
rates and eﬀectively is demand determined.
We are interested in figuring out whether an equilibrium with valued deposits
exists and whether it is unique or not. In such an equilibrium households are
willing to hold bank liabilities at  = 1. Because at  = 1 competition is between
cash and sight deposits, we define an equilibrium with valued deposits as follows:
Definition 2 An equilibrium with valued deposits is an equilibrium in which
either 12  0, 22  0, or both.
Equilibrium in this economy seems a complicated object as it involves a total
of 20 variables, 14 of which are allocations and 6 are prices. Notice, however,
this complexity gets significantly reduced once we apply the following lemma.
Lemma 1 In an equilibrium with valued deposits and liquidation of the produc-
tive technology, so that   0 for some  ∈ {1 2},  =  =  = 0 for all
 ∈ {1 2}.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Although the proof of the lemma is in the Appendix, its intuition is clear once
we compare the returns associated with households’ choices. For that, notice
households have five margins with which to transfer resources between  = 1 and
 = 2. First, they could liquidate the production technology, . Reducing the
liquidation of the project by one monetary unit at  = 1 raises 21 monetary
units at  = 2. Second, households could store goods, . Buying one monetary
unit worth of storage at  = 1 will produce a revenue of 21 monetary units at
 = 2. Third, they could hoard cash, . The nominal return of this investment
is just 1. Fourth, households could accumulate sight deposits, 2 , with a gross
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nominal return of 1 + 2. Finally, there is the liquidation of the time deposits,. Reducing the liquidation of the time deposit by one monetary unit increases
resources at  = 2 by (1 + )(1− ). This is because of the liquidation fee .
Clearly, since   1, it is in the interest of the households to reduce the
liquidation of the productive technology by reducing storing. Thus, if in equi-
librium it is optimal to liquidate part of the production technology,   0, it
should imply that storing is zero. At the same time, if sight deposits are valued
it must be the case that 2  0 and dominate cash in rate of return. To see this,
assume that 2 ≤ 0. In such a case, households would demand cash instead of
sight deposits at  = 1. But, to obtain the cash demanded by their customers,
banks would need to borrow it from the central bank at the rate   0. Thus,
banks have incentives to increase the remuneration of sight deposits above 0.
But in that case, households would cease to demand cash and accumulate sight
deposits instead. Finally, below we will see that in equilibrium it must be the
case that  ≥ 2. Thus, the cost of liquidating the time deposit at  = 1 exceeds
the return on investing in either cash or sight deposits and it is in the interest
of households to set  = 0.
With this lemma in hand, we can now show the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exists an equilibrium with valued deposits in which con-
sumption levels are
1 = 1, 2 =  (28)
and the liquidation of the productive technology satisfies
1 + (1− )2 =  (29)
Furthermore, interest rates obey
1 + 2 = 21  (30)
1 +  = 1 +  = (1 + 1)(1 + 2)  1 (31)
while the inflation rate is bounded by
1
 
2
1 
1 + 
(1− )  (32)
Proof. See the Appendix.
This is as much of the equilibrium as it can be characterized. However, even
without solving for specific values for the endogenous variables, some conclusions
can be drawn. First, as shown in (28), the equilibrium in the nominal economy
does not provide households with any degree of insurance. The intuition of this
result is as follows. Banks in this economy cannot make any promise about
the real value of deposits, nor they can condition the rates on sight deposits on
household types. Thus, eﬀectively they cannot write deposit contracts with real
contingent payouts.
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One could think that a way out of this ineﬃcient outcome could be to allow
banks to condition the rate on sight deposits at  = 2, 2, on household types.
This could be done simply by indexing that interest rate to the withdrawals the
household makes at  = 1 since impatient households have a higher propensity to
spend at that period. We are, however, reluctant to explore that possibility for
several reasons. On the one hand, in reality sight deposits do not work that way
since, by definition, they are spot contracts. Each period a rate is determined for
everyone that is not history dependent. This type of contingencies is precisely
what time deposits try to accomplish, not sight deposits. On the other hand, it
is not clear how this type of remuneration would aﬀect the equilibrium. Because
of perfect competition in the banking industry, a household facing a reduced rate
in a bank because of its withdrawal history may decide to move its funds to a
diﬀerent bank. It is not clear the recipient bank has incentives to apply the
same reduced rate to these new funds.
Looking at the CIA constraint (17) together with the equilibrium values for
consumption and storage, it must be the case that
1 ≤ (1 + 1)1
Notice the corresponding constraint for patient households (23) is not binding
for sure. Thus, 1 has the interpretation of a precautionary demand for liquidity
which has to be strictly positive.
As a second result, notice in equilibrium some liquidation of the productive
technology has to be done if impatient households are to consume. This means
that   0 for some  ∈ {1 2]. Thus, storage is not used as it was explained
in Lemma 1. In fact, the only other margin used to transfer resources from
 = 1 to  = 2 is sight deposits which implies that their real return should equal
that of the productive technology, , as (30) states. In other words, because
households have accumulated financial claims at  = 1, in an equilibrium with
valued deposits the rate of such claims should be such that they are maintained
until the corresponding financial asset, loans in this case, mature. In such sce-
nario, individual households are indiﬀerent between liquidating the productive
technology at  = 1, deposit the revenues from selling those goods and obtaining
the corresponding proceeds at  = 2, or else, maintaining the initial real invest-
ment until maturity. However, in equilibrium a significant fraction of households
should liquidate the productive project so that impatient households can con-
sume. That is why expression (29) does not pin down individual productive
liquidation rates but the aggregate one.
Third, from the point of view of the banks, lending out an additional mone-
tary unit produces a revenue of 1+  at  = 2. However, given that households
do not demand cash, the cost for a bank of producing that loan is remunerating
the corresponding liability, either in the form of a time or a sight deposit. In
equilibrium, because time deposits are not liquidated at  = 1, the marginal
cost of maintaining these liabilities between  = 0 and  = 2 should be the same
and equal to the marginal revenue of providing the loan, as specified in (31).
Regarding nominal lending, the equilibrium does not determine the size of the
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banking sector as represented by the initial loan  . All nominal variables are
proportional to it.
Finally, expression (32) claims that, for deposits to be valued, the inflation
rate between  = 1 and  = 2 should be large enough to discourage the use
of cash. Also, that inflation rate should be low enough so that households do
not liquidate the time deposit and accumulate sight deposits instead. Notice
the equilibrium implies price indeterminacy. As long as expressions (30), (31)
and (32) are satisfied, the real allocation is independent of the particular values
assigned to prices in the economy.
4.2.3 The possibility of a run on a single bank
In a bank run, households decide in  = 1 they do not trust their bank to be
solvent and withdraw their funds. Notice both impatient and patient households
need funds at  = 2 to pay back the loan they asked for at  = 0. Thus, when
households are concerned about solvency, all of them, independent of their type,
may have incentives to transfer funds between  = 1 and  = 2 by means of a
diﬀerent asset than the deposits at their bank.
To make the run comparable with the one in DD, we assume it takes place
at the beginning of  = 1, before households start purchasing goods but after
they know their types. When the run aﬀects only a single bank, depositors of
that depository institution decide to withdraw their deposits, totally liquidating
their time deposits,  = . Here, the superscript  denotes that the run is
in a single bank. Because there are no solvency concerns with respect to other
banks, and because deposits still dominate cash in rate of return, these funds
are then transferred to a diﬀerent financial institution as sight deposits. As the
bank that is run is an atomistic agent in the economy, this means that prices
remain at their equilibrium values
1 +  = 1 +  = (1 + 1)(1 + 2)
and
21 = 1 + 

2  1
Also, assuming all customers of the running bank distribute themselves among
the rest of banks in the economy, the balance sheets of the recipient banks are
not altered.
Notice that, as the run is assumed to happen at  = 1, all households have
already chosen the split between 1 and . These choices stay at their equilib-
rium values since they were determined at  = 0. Let 1 be the normalized
amount withdrawed from the bank at the beginning of  = 1 and transferred
to a diﬀerent financial institution, aggregated across all depositors of the bank.
This is the aggregate amount the bank needs to borrow from the central bank.
At  = 2, for the bank to be solvent it needs to be the case that
 = 1 +  − (1 + )1 ≥ 0
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Thus, the withdrawal customers can make should be
1 = min
½
(1 + 1)1 + (1− ) 1 + 

1 + 
¾
given that (1+ 1)1 + (1− ) is the value of deposits at  = 1. That is, in the
event of a run at a bank, 1 is the maximum amount of reserves the central
bank will be willing to lend to that bank. Assuming customers are served as
they place the order the transfers, the fraction
 = min
½
1 + 
(1 + ) [(1 + 1)1 + (1− )]  1
¾
of first depositors withdrawing, will get (1+ 1)1+(1−) while the remaining
fraction 1−  will get 0.
We then have the following result.
Proposition 2 Households do not have incentives to coordinate in a run in
their bank, given that the remaining banks are solvent, as long as the refinancing
rate is low enough, in particular, as long as
1 +  ≤ 1 + 

1 + 1 − (1 + )  (33)
If this condition is not satisfied, a self-fulfilling run on any of the banks is
supported in equilibrium. In such a case,
1  1 = 1 and 2  2 = 
so that both patient and impatient households are worse oﬀ as compared with
the equilibrium without the run.
Proof : See the Appendix.
When households decide on the possibility of joining a run in their bank, they
evaluate the extent to which the bank will be solvent at  = 2. Solvency will
now depend on the relative costs of the reserves needed to satisfy the transfers
demanded by the bank’s customers. According to this Proposition, multiplicity
of equilibria, and the possibility of a self-fulfilling run on a particular bank,
depends on the level of the oﬃcial rate of the central bank. For relatively low
rates, there is only one equilibrium with solvent banks, while for relatively high
rates, there is also an inferior equilibrium in which depositors coordinate in a
run. Condition (33) specifies the threshold for the refinancing rate, above which
the bank becomes insolvent at  = 2 and the run takes place. In such a run,
both households are worse oﬀ since they liquidate the time deposit at a cost.
20
4.2.4 The possibility of an aggregate bank run
Unlike the run on a single bank, in a system-wide run there is no other bank
to turn into and the withdrawals are done either in cash or in goods. Thus,
with a run, 2 = 0 and  =  for both  = {1 2}. Here the superscript 
denotes the fact that there is a run in the whole banking system of the economy.
Notice that, again, as the run is assumed to happen at  = 1, all households
have already chosen the split between 1 and . These choices, together with
the interest for loans, , and  = 0 sight deposits, 1, stay at their equilibrium
values as they were determined at  = 0. Furthermore, because all banks are
aﬀected by a run, aggregate prices, 1 and 2 could be aﬀected.
As before, let 1 the normalized amount withdrawed from any bank at the
beginning of  = 1 and converted into cash. This is the aggregate amount each
bank needs to borrow from the central bank. At  = 2, for the bank to be
solvent it needs to be the case that
2 = 1 +  − (1 + )1 ≥ 0
Thus, the withdrawal customers can make should be
1 = min
½
(1 + 1)1 + (1− ) 1 + 

1 + 
¾

Again, assuming customers are served as they order the transfers, the fraction
 = min
½
1 + 
(1 + ) [(1 + 1)1 + (1− )]  1
¾
of first depositors withdrawing, will get (1+ 1)1+(1−) while the remaining
fraction 1−  will get 0.
With this, the individual problems become choosing , , , and
to maximize
(1) (34)
subject to
1 1 + 1 1 ≤ 1 (35)
12 ≤ 1 − 1 (1 + 1) + 1 1 (36)
and
1 +  ≤ 2 1 + 2(1− 1)+12 (37)
if the household turns out to be impatient, or
(2) (38)
subject to
1 2 ≤ 1  (39)
22 ≤ 1 − 1 2 + 1 2 (40)
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2 2 ≤ 22  (41)
and
1 +  ≤ 2 2 + 2 (1− 2)+22 − 2 2, (42)
if the household turns out to be patient. Here, potentially all endogenous vari-
ables are aﬀected with the exception of 1, , , and 1 which are determined
at  = 0.
Because all banks need to borrow funds equal to (1 + 1)1 + (1− ) from
the central bank, their normalized net worth at  = 2 would be
2 = 1 +  − (1 + ) [(1 + 1)1 + (1− )] 
We have the following result.
Proposition 3 Households do not have incentives to coordinate in a run in
their bank, given that runs are occurring at the remaining banks, as long as the
refinancing rate is low enough, in particular, as long as
1 +  ≤ 1 + 

1 + 1 − (1 + )  (43)
If this condition is not satisfied, money is not valued in equilibrium, that is, both
1 →∞ and 2 →∞.
Proof : See the Appendix.
The intuition of the first part of the proposition is as before. If the bank
can aﬀord the reserves needed to satisfy liquidation of deposits, then it will
remain solvent and customers will not join the run. The second part is a little
bit trickier. For a successful run to exist, money should be valued, otherwise
customers will have no asset in which to transfer purchasing power from  = 1 to
 = 2. However, for an equilibrium with valued money to exist, two conditions
must be fulfilled. First, markets for goods must clear. For goods markets at
 = 1 this means some liquidation of the productive technology must happen. As
Lemma 1 stated, in such a case, storage will not be used. So, for goods markets
at  = 2 to clear, liquidation at  = 1 cannot be total. The second condition
involves money to be valued. For that, money should have the same real rate of
return as the productive technology, namely, there should be a deflation equal
to 1. In other words, in an aggregate run, the marginal rate of transformation
between  = 1 and  = 2 still should be  as in the equilibrium without the run.
As shown in the Appendix, substituting (35) and (36) into (37) as well as
(39) and (40) into (42) produces
2 = 1 = 
∙
1− 11
¡
1 +  −1
¢¸  
so that 2   = 2 and 1  1 = 1. However, from the market clearing
conditions, the only combination of consumption consistent with the marginal
rate of transformation  is (1 ). Thus, unless nominal prices satisfy 1 → ∞
and 2 →∞ and money is not valued, there is no equilibrium. Basically, with
the run, the economy reverts to autarky.
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5 Conclusions and Implications
In this paper we have provided a model for analyzing the maturity transfor-
mation and liquidity insurance dispensed by banks in a nominal economy with
endogenous money creation. In the model banks commit to implement a pay-
ment system. In this setup, we make an explicit separation between the liquidity
created through lending and the reserves held by depository institutions at the
central bank. Sight deposits are used by depositors to acquire consumption
goods while reserves are employed by the banks to service payment orders and
oﬀset liquidity risk. Moreover, we also diﬀerentiate between the liquidation of
financial (nominal) assets and real investments. Withdrawals generally imply
the convertibility to sight deposits produced by other banks. The liquidation of
bank assets to honor this commitment does not imply, however, the extinction
of the real investment loans finance. The reason is that most of the assets orig-
inated are noncallable, and the liquidation of loans results in selling the right
to the future cash flows they generate.
Our paper can be viewed as corroborating the hypothesis, already included
in Diamond and Dybvig [12], about the equivalence between deposit insurance
and the lender of last resort function of central banks when technology is risk-
less. There is one caveat, though. We observe that, in equilibrium, nominal
deposit contracts do not reproduce the eﬃcient allocation traditionally found in
the previous literature. The interpretation of this result is that, in a nominal
setup, depository institutions cannot commit to support a particular consump-
tion bundle according to the future liquidity needs of their depositors. Since
inside money creation in our model is linked to loan origination, the counter-
part to loan provision is the creation of debt contracts redeemable on demand.
The debt holder chooses the demandability of these liabilities, namely sight
and time deposits, but it does not achieve the optimality in terms of liquidity
risk-sharing.
On the policy front, we show that the existence of a self-fulfilling equilibria
depends on the refinancing rate of the central bank. In the model depositors
only have incentives to withdraw early if they anticipate the insolvency of the
depository institution. We study the possibility of an individual bank run as in
Diamond and Dybvig [12], as well as the existence of a system-wide run in which
depositors of the entire banking system coordinate in a run. In both cases, we
state that whenever the central bank provides outside money at proper rates,
depositors will anticipate the solvency of the banking system and the eventual
illiquidity of the bank will not imply its bankruptcy.14
The failing response of the Fed to oﬀset the banking panics during the De-
pression can be consider as a case study to support the view that an eﬀective
discount-window lending policy can prevent bank runs. As noted by Meltzer
[26], [27], the Fed was at the center of the forces creating the banking panics
of 1930-1933. The misreading of monetary conditions was explained by the im-
plementation of an ineﬀective discount window mechanism, manifested by the
14This eventuality was also anticipated by Diamond and Dybvig [12] when they stated that
the central bank would buy bank assets "... for prices greater than their liquidating value."
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massive decline in the money supply, a collapse of the public’s deposit currency
ratio, and the exclusive access to this facility to member banks.
Further evidence of the role of central banks to prevent a wave of panics
can be found in the response of the Federal Reserve of Atlanta in the period
1929-1933. The extraordinary and aggressive measures adopted by the Atlanta
Fed to inject liquidity in the region helped to prevent the banking panic in
Florida in 1929 (Carlson et al. [10]), and to contain the failures of Mississippi’s
banks during the initial banking panic of the 1930s (Richardson and Troost [28]).
This evidence highlights the importance of the Bagehot’s doctrine in the event
of expectational panics of the Diamond and Dybvig type: a lender of last resort
policy that commits to provide liquidity to banks can be eﬀective to prevent a
system-wide run and restore the confidence of depositors in the banking system.
Finally, another interesting feature of the model described here is that it pro-
vides an explicit bridge between banking and monetary theories. At least from
a quantitative point of view, bridging this gap seems important since liabilities
of depository institutions make the bulk of broad monetary aggregates. For the
US, travelers checks and checkable deposits have represented about 67 percent
of M1 over the period 1959-2017, while these items together with small time de-
posits and savings deposits have represented an average 85 percent of M2 over
the same period. For the euro area, the liabilities of depository institutions have
represented an average of 84, 91 and 83 percent of M1, M2 and M3, respectively
between 1997 and 2017. In the model, both the size of banks’ balance sheet
and the split between monetary and nonmonetary liabilities are endogenous.
Furthermore, the model introduces reserves as a liability of the central bank
which is diﬀerent from the monetary units depository institutions create and
connects it with the payment flows between banks. These connections make
the model a promising tool to open the box as of how central banks are able to
manage economic activity by controlling the cost of expanding bank’s balance
sheet through changes in the level of the refinancing rate.
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6 Appendix: Proofs
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
This section presents a proof of Lemma 1. Here we prove that an equilibrium
with valued deposits implies that depositors do not transfer purchasing power
from period 1 to period 2 in form of storage, time deposits, or hoarding money.
Diﬀerentiating the household’s problem (25) with respect to 1 and  we
obtain ∙

1(1 )
1 + (1− )
2(1 )
1 − 0
¸
1 = 0 (44)
and ∙

1(1 )
 + (1− )
2(1 )
 − 0
¸
 = 0 (45)
where 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (26).
The FOCs associated with problems (16) and (20) are, with respect to con-
sumption, ,
0(1)
1 = 
1
1 + 11 (46)
and 0(2)
2 = 
2
2 + 22 (47)
where 11 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (17), 11 is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with (18), 22 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with
(23) and 22 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (24).
Moreover, diﬀerentiating with respect to storage, , we obtain£212 − 1 ¡11 + 11¢¤1 = 0 (48)
and £222 − 1 ¡21 + 21¢¤2 = 0 (49)
where 12 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (19), 21 is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with (21) and 21 is the Lagrange multiplier associated
with (22).
At the same time, we can diﬀerentiate against the liquidation of the produc-
tive technology, , £111 − 212¤ 1 = 0 (50)
and £121 − 222¤ 2 = 0; (51)
and with respect to liquidation of the time deposit, ,£
(1− ) ¡11 + 11¢− (1 + )12¤ 1 = 0 (52)£
(1− ) ¡21 + 21¢− (1 + )(22 + 22)¤  = 0; (53)
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and, finally, with respect to cash holdings, 2 ,¡12 − 11¢12 = 0 (54)
and ¡22 + 22 − 21¢22 = 0 (55)
and with respect to sight deposits, 2 ,£
(1 + 2)12 − 11
¤ 12 = 0 (56)
and £
(1 + 2)(22 + 22)− 21
¤ 22 = 0 (57)
There is also the envelope conditions with respect to initial sight deposits, 1,
1(1 )
1 = (1 + 

1)
¡11 + 11¢  (58)
and 2(1 )
1 = (1 + 

1)
¡21 + 21¢  (59)
and initial time deposit, ,
1(1 )
 = (1 + 
)12 (60)
and 2(1 )
 = (1 + 
)
¡22 + 22¢  (61)
Given the set of FOCs specified above, we have to prove that, in equilibrium
with valued deposits, so that 2  0, if   0, then  =  =  = 0, for
all  = {1 2}. Given that impatient agents want to consume at  = 1, start
assuming 1  0. Then, from (50),
11
12 =
2
1  (62)
From (48) it must be the case that
212 − 1
¡11 + 11¢  0
so that
1 = 0 (63)
As we are searching for an equilibrium with valued deposits, assume that sight
deposits have positive remuneration in period 2, i.e. 2  0 so, from (54), (55),
(56), and (57), 12  0, 22  0, and
12 = 12 = 0 (64)
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together with
11
12 =
21
22 + 22
= 1 + 2 = 21  (65)
This means that
121 − 222 = 222 ≥ 0
Thus, either 22 = 0 which, from (51) and (65) would imply an interior solution
for 2 and from (23)
22  22 + (1 + 2)12 + (1 + )(− 2)
or else, 22  0 which, from (51) and (65) would imply 2 = 1 and from (23)
22 = 22 + (1 + 2)12 + (1 + )(− 2)
In either case, from (49)
−1 ¡21 + 21¢+ 222  0
which implies
2 = 0 (66)
and 21 = 0. Then, if 22  0, from (24), having condition (23) satisfied with
equality and 2 = 1, would imply 1 +  = 0 which is a contradiction. Then, it
must be the case that 22 = 0 and constraint (23) is not binding.
Summarizing
11
12 =
21
22 = 1 + 

2 =
2
1  (67)
Next, assume agents contract some time deposit so that   0. From (45)
(1 + ) £12 + (1− )22¤ = 0
Substituting for 0 in (44) yields
 £(1 + 1) ¡11 + 11¢− (1 + )¤ 12+(1−) £(1 + 1) ¡21 + 21¢− (1 + )¤ 22 ≤ 0
(68)
otherwise 1 = 1 and  = 0, contradicting the assumption that   0. Looking
at this expression together with (52) and (53) it cannot be the case that both
1  0 and 2  0 simultaneously. To solve for the  assume first that 2  0
so that 1 = 0. Then, from (53) and the results above,
1 + 
1−  =
21
22 =
11
12 = 1 + 

2 =
2
1  (69)
But then, from (52)
(1− )21 + (1− )21 − (1 + )22  0
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which would make the household choose 1 =   0 which contradicts the
assumption that 1 = 0. Now assume that 1  0 so that 2 = 0. Then, from
(52) and the results above,
11 + 11
12 =
1 + 
1−  
11
12 =
21
22 = 1 + 

2 =
2
1 
But if (1− ) ¡11 + 11¢ = (1 + )12, then it must be that (1 + 1) ¡11 + 11¢ 
(1 + )22 so that (1 + 1)21  (1 + )22 or
1 +   (1 + 1)
2
1
22 = (1 + 

1)(1 + 2)
But if this is the case, rolling over the sight deposit is more profitable than
contracting the time deposit and  = 0, which contradicts the idea that 1  0.
Thus, in equilibrium it must be the case that
1 = 2 = 0
To sum up, we have that, when 2  0, if   0, then  =  =  = 0
for all  = {1 2}. ¤
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
By Lemma 1, replacing equilibrium values in (19) and (24) yields
1 +  = 2− 21 + (1 + 1)(1 + 2)1 + (1 + ) (70)
and
1 +  + 22 = 2+ (1 + 1)(1 + 2)1 + (1 + ). (71)
From these two expressions we get 22 = 11. This expression together with the
market clearing conditions in the good markets
1 = 1 + (1− )2
and
(1− )2 = (1− 1)+ (1− )(1− 2)
yields
1 = 1 and 2 = 
so that
 = 1 + (1− )2
To get the equilibrium conditions for the interest rates, we know that the
bank’s net worth at  = 2 is determined as follows
2 ≡ 2 = 1 + 
 −  £(1 + 2)12 + (1 + )¤
−(1− ) £(1 + 2)22 + (1 + )¤
= 1 +  − (1 + )− (1 + 1)(1 + 2)1
=
£
1 +  − (1 + )¤ + £1 +  − (1 + 1)(1 + 2)¤ 1
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so an equilibrium with both 1  0 and   0, implies
1 +  = 1 +  = (1 + 1)(1 + 2) (72)
Finally, using expression (69), for 2  0, so that 2  0 and deposits are valued,
it must be the case that
1
 
2
1 
1 + 
(1− ) 
¤
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We have to find the conditions that support a self-fulfilling equilibrium when
there is a run on a single depository institution. With this, the individual
problems become choosing , , , 1, 2 and 2 to maximize
1(1 ) = max(1) (73)
subject to
11 + 11 ≤ 1 (74)
12 + 12 ≤ 1 − 1(1 + 1) + 11 (75)
and
1 +  ≤ 21 + 2(1− 1)+12 + (1 + 2)12 (76)
if the household turns out to be impatient, or
2(1 ) = max(2) (77)
subject to
12 ≤ 1 (78)
22 + 22 ≤ 1 − 12 + 12 (79)
22 ≤ 22 + (1 + 2)22  (80)
and
1 +  ≤ 22 + 2(1− 2)+22 + (1 + 2)22 − 22 (81)
if the household turns out to be patient. Notice the household still uses sight
deposits at  = 1, 2 , but these funds are deposited at a diﬀerent institution.
The FOCs associated with problems (73) and (77) are now, with respect to
consumption, ,
0(1)
1 = 
1
1 + 11  (82)
and 0(2)
2 = 
2
2 + 22  (83)
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where 11 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (74), 11 is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with (75), 22 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with
(80) and 22 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (81); with respect to
storage, , £212 − 1 ¡11 + 11 ¢¤1 = 0 (84)
and £222 − 1 ¡21 + 21 ¢¤2 = 0 (85)
where 12 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (76), 21 is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with (78) and 21 is the Lagrange multiplier associated
with (79); with respect to liquidation of the productive technology, ,£111 − 212 ¤ 1 = 0 (86)
and £121 − 222 ¤ 2 = 0; (87)
and with respect to cash holdings, 2 ,¡12 − 11 ¢12 = 0 (88)
and ¡22 + 22 − 21 ¢22 = 0; (89)
and with respect to sight deposits, 2 ,£−11 + (1 + 2)12 ¤ 1 = 0 (90)
and £−21 + (1 + 2) ¡22 + 22 ¢¤ 2 = 0 (91)
Because in the equilibrium with valued deposits we need that 2  0 so, from
(88), (89), (90), and (91), we have that 12  0, 22  0, and
12 = 22 = 0 (92)
together with
11
12 =
21
22 + 22
= 1 + 2 = 21  (93)
This means that
111 = 212 
so that from (86) 1  0 while from (84) we obtain 1 = 0. Furthermore, from
(92)
121 − 222 = 222 ≥ 0
Thus, we can distinguish between two possibilities. Either 22  0 which, from
(80) leads to 222 = (1 + 2)22 , and from (87) leads to 2 = 1. This means,
from (81), that 1+ = 0, which clearly is a contradiction. The second possibility
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implies 22 = 0 which, from (80) leads to 222  (1 + 2)22 , and from (87)
implies that 2 has an interior solution. Then, (93) implies
11
12 =
21
22 = 1 + 

2 =
2
1  (94)
Then, from (85), we have that 2 = 0 and from (78) we obtain that 21 = 0.
Substituting equilibrium values in (76) and (81) yields
1 +  = 2− 21 + (1 + 2)1 (95)
and
1 +  + 22 = 2+ (1 + 2)1. (96)
Combining both expressions we get 2 = 1.
Now, two things may happen according to the refinancing rate, . In the first
case, we can assume that the refinancing rate of the central bank is relatively
low
1 +  ≤ 1 + 

(1 + 1)1 + (1− )
In that case, households obtain all the cash they demand, 1 = (1 + 1)1 +
(1− ), and the bank is solvent. Then consumption would be
1 = 1− 11 (

1 + )  1 = 1 (97)
and
2 = − 1 (

1 + )   = 2 (98)
Because households loose consumption and the bank ends up being solvent,
depositors will not have incentives to coordinate in a run if they anticipate that
the central bank will provide liquidity insurance to the depository institution at
a lower rate.
In the second case, we can consider that the refinancing rate of the central
bank is relatively high, such that
1 +   1 + 

(1 + 1)1 + (1− )
In that case, households are restricted in the amount of cash they can withdraw,
1 = (1 + )(1 + ), because the bank will end up being insolvent. Then
consumption would be
1 = 1− 11
∙
1 + 1 − 1 + 

1 + 
¸
 (99)
and
2 = − 1
∙
1 + 1 − 1 + 

1 + 
¸
 (100)
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Notice, because
1 +   1 + 

(1 + 1)1 + (1− ) =
1 + 
1 + 1 − (1 + ) 
we have
1 + 1  1 + 

1 +  + (

1 + )  1 + 

1 +  
so that 1  1 and 2  . In this case, although all households loose with the
run, they will join as they would obtain nothing if they do not. ¤
6.4 Proof of Proposition 3
This section shows the derivation of the optimal conditions when there is a
system-wide run in the economy. We also show the equilibrium condition that
supports a self-fulfilling run in such a case.
The FOCs associated with problems (34) and (38) are now, with respect to
consumption,  , 0(11 )
1 = 
1
1 + 11  (101)
and 0(22 )
2 = 
2
2 + 22  (102)
where 11 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (35), 11 is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with (36), 22 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with
(41) and 22 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (42); with respect to
storage, , h
2 12 − 1
³
11 + 11
´i
1 = 0 (103)
and h
2 22 − 1
³
21 + 21
´i
2 = 0 (104)
where 12 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (37), 21 is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with (39) and 21 is the Lagrange multiplier associated
with (40); with respect to liquidation of the productive technology, ,£1 11 − 2 12 ¤ 1 = 0 (105)
and £1 21 − 2 22 ¤ 2 = 0; (106)
and with respect to cash holdings, 2 ,¡12 − 11 ¢12 = 0 (107)
and ³
22 + 22 − 21
´
22 = 0 (108)
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For an equilibrium to exist it must be the case that either 1  0, or
2  0 or both. Given that impatient agents want to consume at  = 1, start
assuming 1  0. Then, from (105),
11
12 =
2 
1  (109)
From (103) it must be the case that
2 12 − 1
³
11 + 11
´
 0
so that in the run still no productive investment is liquidated by impatient
agents
1 = 0 (110)
Since 1  0 and 1 = 0, from (36), 12  0, so (107) and (109) imply
11
12 = 1 =
2 
1  (111)
which means 2
1 =
1
  1 (112)
and the economy enters a deflation.
On the other hand, from (42), 22  0 too, otherwise 22 = 0, so (108)
implies
21
22 + 22
= 1 (113)
But then
21 = 22 + 22 ≥ 22 
This, together with the result on prices (109) means
−121 − 121 + 222  0
so that, from (104)
2 = 0 (114)
also. However from (39), with 2 = 0, the constraint must be slack and
21 = 0.
Using these equilibrium values in (37) and (42) yields
1 +  = (1 + 1)1 + (1− ) + 2 − 1 11
and
1 +  + 2 22 = (1 + 1)1 + (1− ) + 2.
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From these two expressions we get 22 = 11 . This expression together the
market clearing conditions in the good markets
11 = 1 + (1− )2
and
(1− )22 = (1− 1)+ (1− )(1− 2)
yields
11 = 1 and 22 = 
From the net worth of any bank at the end of period  = 2 normalized by
wealth can be written as
2 ≡ 

2
 = 1 + 
 − (1 + )12 − (1− )(1 + )22
= 1 +  − (1 + )(1 + 1)1 − (1 + )(1− )
Thus, for the bank to be solvent, the refinancing rate must satisfy
1 +  ≤ 1 + 

1 + 1 − (+ 1)  (115)
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